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Abstract
An important part of the influential Humean doctrine in philoso-
phy is the supervenience principle (sometimes referred to as the prin-
ciple of separability). This principle asserts that the complete state
of the world supervenes on the intrinsic properties of its most funda-
mental components and their spatiotemporal relations (the so-called
Humean mosaic). There are well-known arguments in the literature
purporting to show that in quantum mechanics the Humean superve-
nience principle is violated, due to the existence of entangled states.
Recently, however, arguments have been presented to the effect that
the supervenience principle can be defended in Bohmian mechanics.
The key element of this strategy lies in the observation that according
to Bohmian mechanics the fundamental facts about particles are facts
about their spatial locations, and moreover, for any proper subsystem
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of the world its state may non-trivially depend on the spatial config-
uration of the rest of the universe. Thus quantum-mechanical states
of subsystems do not represent their intrinsic properties but rather
characterize their relations with the environment. In this paper we
point out the worry that this Bohmian strategy –known as Bohumi-
anism– saves the letter but not the spirit of the Humean doctrine of
supervenience, since it prima facie violates another seemingly impor-
tant Humean principle, which we call Strong Supervenience and whose
denial implies the existence of necessary connections among distinct
individuals. We argue that the best defense for Bohumians is to ques-
tion the fundamental existence of complex physical systems and their
states by treating any reference to them as a convenient description
of the underlying collection of Bohmian particles. We consider several
pros and cons of this strategy.
Keywords: Humean supervenience; quantum entanglement; Bohmian
mechanics; Bohumianism
1 Introduction
The main purpose of this paper is to critically evaluate the latest attempts
to reconcile modern developments in quantum physics with the broad philo-
sophical doctrine of Humeanism. It is no secret that the worldview emerg-
ing from quantum mechanics turns out to be rather hostile to many vener-
ated philosophical views, such as for instance determinism. The doctrine of
Humeanism, with its insistence on separability, non-modality and reduction-
ism, seems to be another prime target for an assault inspired by quantum
discoveries. And yet, given the persistent popularity of Humeanism among
contemporary philosophers of science, no wonder that this assault is met
with powerful resistance. One recent episode in an ongoing battle between
various philosophical approaches to quantum mechanics started out with a
vigorous attack on Humeanism at the hands of Tim Maudlin in his provoca-
tively titled piece “Why be Humean?” (Maudlin, 2007). It didn’t take long
before defenders of the “greatest denier of necessary connections” responded
to this challenge in various ways. A particularly interesting response has
been based on a popular in philosophical circles interpretation of quantum
mechanics known as Bohmian mechanics (Miller, 2014; Esfeld, 2014; Callen-
der, 2015; Bhogal and Perry, 2017). In our contribution to this debate we
will try to identify some weak points of this strategy, and we will suggest, on
behalf of the Bohmians, how to strengthen their defensive position.
The plan of this article is as follows. Section 2 is mainly expository, de-
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voted to the presentation of the main assumptions and arguments in Maudlin’s
original polemic with Humeanism, as well as the general strategy of de-
fense against Maudlin’s attack. Here we will introduce two pillars of the
Humean doctrine: the rejection of modal facts and the elimination of nec-
essary connections between separate entities, and we will present the well-
known Humean principles of Physical Statism and Separability. Reconstruct-
ing Maudlin’s criticism of Separability based on the example of entangled
states (singlet- and triplet-spin states), we will formulate an equivalent ver-
sion of Separability that we call Supervenience, and we will show, following
Elizabeth Miller, how Supervenience can be defended by denying that the
singlet and triplet-states are intrinsic to the quantum systems. In section
3 we will explore the physical details of Bohmian mechanics relevant to the
above-mentioned strategy of defending Humeanism. We will stress the nomo-
logical character of the universal wave function (interpreted according to the
Best System approach), and we will introduce the concept of an effective
wave function that enables us to make a distinction between physical sys-
tems and their environments while still admitting that the states of these
systems are not intrinsic to them.
Section 4 is central to the article. In it we present our main critique of
the Bohmian defense of Humeanism, which is that Separability (or Superve-
nience) by itself does not guarantee that no necessary connections between
separate entities will be present. Supervenience ensures the lack of necessary
connections between fundamental objects, but does not exclude the possi-
bility that these connections may emerge at higher levels of complexity. To
clarify this further, we spell out the conditions of Strong Supervenience and
Binary Separability that in our opinion should constitute parts of the broader
Humean doctrine, and we argue that Bohmian mechanics refutes them. In
section 5 we discuss one possible way for Bohmians to continue their commit-
ment to Humeanism by denying the objective existence of complex entities
on a par with fundamental objects. We explain why this move does not im-
ply that objects of our experiences are mere illusions or arbitrary constructs.
We end the article with a suggestion for Bohmians to bite the bullet and go
“Democritean”, i.e. accept that only fundamental particles (“atoms”) exist
in the most literal sense of the word.
2 Humeanism and Quantum Mechanics
The modern version of Humeanism is based on two intuitions, both of which
can be traced back to David Hume himself. One of them is skepticism regard-
ing irreducible modal facts: facts involving necessity, possibility, dispositions,
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powers, counterfactuals etc. The other intuition suggests that there can be
no necessary connections between separate entities.1 The first intuition can
be expressed in the statement that all facts about the world are exhausted
in its total state that tells us what the world is, as opposed to what it could,
or would, or ought to be. All purported modal facts, encompassed for in-
stance in laws or tendencies or dispositions or whatever, are to be ultimately
reducible to the total state of the world (in the sense that there could be
no difference in modal facts without the underlying difference in the total
state).
The non-existence of necessary connections between separate individuals
gives us more insight into the internal composition of the total state of the
world according to Humeanism. Roughly speaking, the state of the world
should be decomposable into the states of separate individuals plus their spa-
tiotemporal arrangements. The so-called Humean mosaic, consisting of the
assignment of intrinsic, natural and non-modal properties to individual ob-
jects, together with the spatiotemporal arrangement of these objects, should
be sufficient to fix the state of the entire world. Admitting any facts beyond
what is included in the Humean mosaic would amount to the acceptance
of fundamental correlations between distinct entities that are not reducible
to their intrinsic properties and spatiotemporal relations, and hence would
infringe the second Humean intuition.
Tim Maudlin’s verbalization of Lewis’s variant of Humeanism has become
the gold standard in the literature. He spells out two principles he calls
Physical Statism and Separability as follows (Maudlin, 2007, p. 51):
(Physical Statism) All facts about a world, including modal and
nomological facts, are determined by its total physical state.
(Separability) The complete physical state of the world is de-
termined by (supervenes on) the intrinsic physical state of each
spacetime point (or each point-like object) and the spatiotempo-
ral relations between those points.
As Bhogal and Perry (2017, p. 74) point out, Physical Statism and Sep-
arability jointly imply that the world is fundamentally non-modal, and that
there are no necessary connections at the fundamental level. The last suppo-
sition is secured by Separability, since Separability ensures that fundamental
1We are not claiming that these two intuitions are independent from one another. In
particular, it may be argued that rejecting irreducible modal facts, as per the first intuition,
eliminates necessary connections between distinct entities. On the other hand, it is at least
feasible to reject irreducible modal facts as parts of the world, and still insist that there are
some necessary connections which present themselves in the fact that certain combinations
of fundamental, non-modal properties are not admissible.
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objects are characterized by intrinsic states, and intrinsic properties by defi-
nition are possessed by an entity independently of anything else in the world.
It is worth stressing that the supervenience basis described in Maudlin’s Sep-
arability consists of fundamental entities (points or point-like entities) that
cannot be further decomposed into smaller constituents. This is a rather
important restriction, since from Separability understood in such a way it
does not immediately follow that an analogous principle will hold for non-
fundamental objects and their properties. In other words, it may still be the
case that the total state of the world is not reducible to the Humean mosaic
consisting of larger, non-fundamental individuals (for instance middle-size
objects of our everyday experience).
Maudlin argues that Separability comes under severe fire from the de-
velopment of quantum physics. Here entangled states provide the required
ammunition. An entangled state of a two-particle system is a state that can-
not be written as a product of two one-particle states. It is possible to find
two distinct entangled states such that both give the exact same predictions
regarding the behavior of individual particles taken separately (they produce
the same reduced states for each particle), and yet they differ with respect to
the global measurable features of the entire system. The example given by
Maudlin uses the singlet and triplet spin-states of two electrons. Both states
give identical statistical predictions regarding individual electrons: the prob-
ability of obtaining any result (up or down) for spin in any chosen direction
equals 50%. And yet when the system is in the singlet spin state the results
of measurements of spin in the same direction on both particles are always
anticorrelated (they have opposite values), while in the case of the triplet
state we can choose a direction of spin measurement in which both outcomes
must be the same. Thus the quantum state of the whole two-particle system
does not supervene on the intrinsic properties of the separate particles and
their spatiotemporal locations.
However, the argument from quantum entanglement does not directly
affect Maudlin’s Separability, as the latter principle concerns the world as a
whole and not small isolated systems such as a two-electron system. In order
to question Separability we need an additional assumption that would enable
us to get from the violation of Humean supervenience at a local level to the
global violation. The missing link was identified by Elizabeth Miller (Miller,
2014) as the claim that the quantum state of a two-electron system forms
its intrinsic property.2 From this assumption we can now derive that the
2We do not wish to enter the intricate debate on the exact meaning of “intrinsic prop-
erties”. For our purposes it is sufficient to accept the following partial characteristic: if an
intrinsic property of a system X supervenes on any property of an object Y , Y has to be
a spatiotemporal part of X.
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singlet and triplet states of two electrons cannot supervene on properties of
objects other than the electrons themselves, since this would contravene the
intrinsic character of the two-particle states. Thus neither singlet nor triplet
states supervene on any properties of the fundamental elements of the world
(whether or not these elements are parts of the considered system) and their
spatiotemporal arrangements. And because the total state of the world must
contain the states of its components, Separability is violated.
Proceeding slightly more formally, we can first introduce a new principle
that can be simply called Supervenience:
(Supervenience) For any physical system S, the intrinsic prop-
erties of S supervene on the intrinsic physical states and spa-
tiotemporal relations between points and pointlike objects that
are parts of S.3
Given some reasonable assumptions, it can be proven that Supervenience
is in fact equivalent to Separability. Because trivially all the properties of
the entire world are intrinsic to it, Separability follows from Supervenience
(if we assume that the world constitutes a physical system, which seems
plausible). The entailment in the opposite direction can be shown as follows.
If Supervenience were false, some intrinsic properties of a particular system
S would not supervene on the Humean mosaic of fundamental, point-like
objects that are parts of S. But intrinsic properties of system S cannot
depend on any object spatiotemporally external from S, hence the intrinsic
properties of S do not supervene on the fundamental properties of point-like
objects at all. Provided that the intrinsic properties of any physical system
are parts of the total state of the world, this means that Separability is false.
It is clear that the example of the singlet and triplet states directly vi-
olates Supervenience, if only these states qualify as intrinsic properties of
appropriate systems. But here one escape route immediately opens up. We
can namely attempt to save Supervenience (and Separability) by denying
that the singlet and triplet states represent genuine intrinsic properties of
physical systems. This is precisely the strategy adopted by Miller in her
attempt to defend Humeanism against Maudlin’s argument. If we can argue
that the singlet or triplet states of a system of two particles depend non-
trivially on the properties of objects extrinsic from this system, Maudlin’s
argument can be repelled.4
3Miller calls the negation of Supervenience Metaphysical holism (Miller, 2014, p. 568).
4Another strategy of how to deal with Maudlin’s challenge to Humeanism has been
considered by George Darby (Darby, 2012). The idea is roughly to include in the superve-
nience basis irreducible relations between particles occupying the singlet or triplet state,
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In order to provide a philosophically clear discussion of this strategy,
we will focus on the so-called “primitive ontology” approach to quantum
physics (see Allori et al., 2008, for a technical discussion of the framework),
In particular, we will follow Miller in framing the discussion in the context
of non-relativistic Bohmian mechanics.5
3 The Best System Approach to Bohmian
Mechanics
Bohmian mechanics, in rough outline, is based on the assumption that the
world consists of fundamental particles which have well-defined trajectories.
The modern version of the theory,6 as set out in Dürr et al. (2013), is in fact
the simplest non-local Galilean-invariant theory of N moving particles. The
dynamics of the theory is given by:
i~
∂
∂t
Ψ(Q, t) = HˆΨ(Q, t); (1a)
dQ
dt
= ~m−1Im〈Ψ,∇Ψ〉〈Ψ,Ψ〉 (Q, t). (1b)
Q =
 q1· · ·
qN
 ∈ R3N represents an instantaneous configuration of N parti-
cles, ∇ =
 ∇1· · ·
∇N
 is the “gradient vector”, m is the N ×N diagonal “mass
matrix” {δijmi}, and 〈·, ·〉 is an appropriate inner product defined over the
space of wave functions.
thus expanding the Humean mosaic. Darby claims that this move saves the reductive spirit
of Humeanism, but he himself admits that some form of holism has to be accepted, which
may be seen as departing from the Humean idea that everything that is is the local mat-
ters of particular fact. To that we would like to add that admitting irreducible, external
relations between distinct individuals violates the intuition of no necessary connections.
Clearly, the holding of the relation of anticorrelation between electrons in the singlet spin
state implies that there is a necessary connection between the values of the spin of both
electrons.
5We stress the fact that here we are adopting a primitive ontology approach just as a
working hypothesis that lets us exemplify the issues at stake, being fully aware that not
everybody would agree with this choice (see Ney and Philips, 2013, for a critical discussion
of the primitive ontology approach).
6The roots of the theory can be traced back to the work of Louis de Broglie (see
de Broglie, 1928).
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To sum up, (1b) is a concise way to write N coupled equations of the
form:
dqk
dt
= ~
mk
Im
〈Ψ,∇kΨ〉
〈Ψ,Ψ〉 (Q, t). (2)
Formally, (1b) depicts a vector field on R3N depending on Ψ, whose inte-
gral curves Q = Q(t) can each be “unpacked” as collections of N continuous
trajectories {qi = qi(t)}i=1,...,N .7 The dynamics encoded in (1) is determin-
istic: once provided a set of initial conditions (Ψ0,Q0) at a fixed time t0, the
dynamics singles out a unique dynamical evolution at earlier and later times.
Moreover, it can be shown that (1) recovers Born’s rule of standard quantum
mechanics, thus matching all the empirical predictions of this latter theory
(Dürr et al., 1992, provide a detailed justification of this claim).
The above formalism establishes that Bohmian mechanics is a theory of
N point-like particles with definite positions qk = (xk, yk, zk) in Euclidean
3-space at all times. The non-locality of the theory is evident in (2), the
velocity of the k-th particle particle being instantaneously dependent on the
positions of all the other N − 1 particles. Furthermore, Bohmian mechanics
is by construction a universal theory since (1) describes the dynamics of all
there is in the universe –i.e. particles. The role of the wave function in this
picture is to generate the vector field on the right-hand side of (1b), and it is
thus said to “guide” the motion of the particles. A key point to be stressed
is that the formalism works well with any type of wave function, including
spinor states (of which singlet/triplet states represent a particular case).
Put in these terms, a natural interpretation of the wave function as a
law-like element of the formalism suggests itself. To see this, we can fol-
low (as people like Miller and Esfeld do) the well-trodden path taken by
many Humeans with respect to the laws of nature. According to the Best
System Approach (known also as the Mill-Ramsey-Lewis theory) laws are
axioms systematizing our knowledge of individual facts that achieve the best
balance between strength and simplicity (see Hall, 2015, for an exhaustive in-
troduction to the subject). In other words, laws ultimately supervene on the
collection of individual facts. In the same vein, the universal wave function
can be treated as a law that gives us the best description of the behavior
of individual particles.8 In this sense, the Humean treatment of quantum
7People like David Albert (see, e.g., Albert, 1996) would deny the need for this last step.
For them, the real dynamics literally unfolds in a higher dimensional space, where a single
“world-particle” is pushed around by a “Ψ-field”. We will not consider this controversial
reading of (1) here.
8However, see Dewar (2018) for a recent critique of the Best System approach to
Bohmian mechanics. We do not wish to take a stand on whether this critique is se-
rious enough to undermine Bohumianism independently of our objections developed in
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physics is very similar to that of classical physics. The mosaic is given by the
history of change of particle positions9 over time and their mutual spatiotem-
poral relations, of which the wave function (or, say, the Hamiltonian, in the
classical case) represent just (a part of) the simplest and most informative
description. In this context, all the physical properties usually encoded in
the wave function can be reduced to the mutual arrangement of particles
throughout the entire history of the universe, spin being one of such proper-
ties.10 It is important to stress the fact that this story makes sense because
Bohmian mechanics by construction accords a metaphysically privileged sta-
tus to positions, otherwise one could wonder why, among the many physically
possible bases onto which the quantum state could be projected, we just focus
on the position basis. Hence, if we adopt this perspective, then the entangle-
ment encoded in the wave function does not represent anymore a threat to a
Humean reading of Bohmian mechanics. In fact, it seems that Bohmianism
may be argued to satisfy Separability. To emphasize the Humean character
of Bohmian mechanics, Miller even coins the term “Bohumianism”.
It is enlightening to see how Bohumianism concretely defuses Maudlin’s
challenge. Let’s start from the trivial case in which the two-particle system is
all there is to the world. In this case, the mosaic would be too meager to be
describable in terms of singlet/triplet states. Particles’ relative motion might
instead allow for, e.g., a description in terms of simple Coulomb interactions.
In this case, Maudlin’s challenge is dodged rather than defused. The most
interesting case involves, of course, the actual world.
The first question to be answered, then, is how Bohmian mechanics is able
to describe the behavior of our pair of entangled particles, given that they
represent just a small portion of the universal N -particle configuration. Let’s
call q the two-particle subsystem andQ the rest of the configuration. Clearly,
(q,Q) = Q. Now, in general there is no physically interesting case in which
the universal wave function Ψ can be written as a simple product state of
the form Ψ(Q) = ψ(q)φ(Q). However, there are more physically interesting
cases in which it can be written as Ψ(Q) = ψ(q)φ(Q) + Ψ⊥(Q) and the
section 4.
9Standard Humeans would add some natural intrinsic properties, such as mass and
charge, on top of positions. However, it is now clear that nothing over and above particles’
(relative) positions and change thereof is needed in order to make sense of the Humean
approach to laws of physics. See Esfeld et al. (2018) for a presentation of this “Super-
Humean” stance.
10Such a construction is not immune to criticism. For example, Matarese (2018), ar-
gues that purging the mosaic of all natural properties makes it impossible to establish
which description among the many possible is in fact the simplest and most informative.
Simpson (2019), goes as far as arguing that a mosaic consisting only of material particles’
trajectories is untenable.
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wave packet Ψ⊥(Q) remains empty throughout the dynamical evolution (i.e.
it never gets to “guide” any particle). This happens when the following
conditions are met:
1. ψφ and Ψ⊥ do not substantially overlap in configuration space.
2. Q always lies in a region of configuration space where Ψ⊥ is close to
zero but φ is not.
In this case, we recover the orthodox picture11 in which system and envi-
ronment are assigned an effective wave function, ψ and φ respectively, each
of which is subjected to a Schrödinger-like dynamics. From this point on, we
can give the standard quantum description of ψ(q) and φ(Q) in terms of a
“subsystem” and its “environment” (see, Dürr et al. (1992), section 5, for a
far more rigorous presentation of this topic).
The above story makes it manifest why there is strictly speaking nothing
in the effective wave function ψ that is intrinsic to the two-particle system.
Indeed, ψ is just the tip of the iceberg of a more complex description involving
also the particles in the environment. In other words, we say that the two-
particle subsystem is in a singlet or triplet state just in virtue of how the
trajectories of the two particles are related to those of the particles making
up, say, a Stern-Gerlach apparatus. In this sense, the appropriate ontological
picture is not that of an initially isolated subsystem that gets mixed with
the environment as a result of the dynamical evolution but, rather, that of
a global mosaic of trajectories to which we attach a simple and informative
description in terms of subsystem/environment. The important point is that
all the relevant information to account for, say, the detection of a two-particle
system in a singlet or triplet state is crafted, so to speak, in the mosaic:
nothing more is needed. In this sense, there is no question whether quantum
physics is compatible with Humeanism.
Does all of this mean that Humeanism is fully vindicated in Bohmian
mechanics? Well, not so fast!
4 A Challenge to Bohumianism
The key point of our critique of the above-described strategy is the obser-
vation that while Separability reflects strong Humean sentiments, it by no
means exhausts the entire Humean doctrine, as encompassed in the two basic
11The reader interested in nonstandard approaches to quantum measurements (espe-
cially those dispensing with decoherence), can take a look at, e.g., Drossel and Ellis (2018).
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intuitions mentioned in section 2 (no irreducible modal facts and no neces-
sary connections). In other words, we argue that it is possible to have a
non-strictly Humean theory that still preserves Separability, and Bohmian
mechanics may fall in this category. To see that, let us start by noting that
there are two distinct ways of satisfying the requirement of Supervenience
for a given physical system. One way is direct and straightforward: the to-
tal physical state of any system is intrinsic to it, and moreover supervenes
on the Humean mosaic consisting entirely of the system’s parts. However,
Supervenience can also be satisfied vacuously, as it is essentially a condi-
tional statement: if P is an intrinsic property of S, then P supervenes on
the properties and spatiotemporal relations of S’s parts. But what if S has
no interesting intrinsic properties (i.e. its physical state turns out to be an
extrinsic property)? Then the conditional is true, but its truth follows simply
from the falsity of the antecedent. There is no genuine supervenience here,
because there is no property to which the supervenience could be attributed
in the first place.
The distinction we’ve made immediately suggests a natural strengthen-
ing of the Supervenience principle: rather than limiting the supervenience
property to the intrinsic features of physical systems, we may extend it to
all their physical states. Thus a stronger Supervenience presents itself:
(Strong Supervenience) For any physical system S, the complete
physical state of S supervenes on the intrinsic physical states
and spatiotemporal relations between points and pointlike objects
that are parts of S.12
It should be noted that the only difference between Strong Supervenience
and Supervenience is that the former drops the condition of intrinsicality
with respect to the complete physical state of S. However, this difference
has some dramatic consequences. In particular, Bohmian mechanics vio-
lates Strong Supervenience, since the singlet/triplet states of two electrons
do not supervene on the properties of the individual electrons and their spa-
tiotemporal arrangements, as we have explained in the previous section. But
is Strong Supervenience a necessary part of any Humean doctrine? Can a
Humean accept a situation in which the total physical state of a system
contains an irreducible reference to objects spatiotemporally separated from
this system? We believe not, since such a scenario clearly flies in the face
of the second Humean intuition regarding the lack of necessary connections
between separate entities. It seems that a committed Humean should sub-
12Bhogal and Perry (2017) call this principle Strong Separability.
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scribe to the following variant of Separability that we call Binary Separability,
which entails Strong Supervenience:
(Binary Separability) For any physical system S equipped with
its own physical state, the complete state of the world super-
venes on the intrinsic properties of S, intrinsic properties of its
environment E, and the spatiotemporal relations between S and
E.
According to Separability, the supervenience basis for the total state of
the world consists of the most fundamental elements of reality (points or
point-like objects). Binary Separability, on the other hand, insists that a su-
pervenience basis can be also found on non-fundamental levels. This stronger
principle ensures that each time when we identify a physical system that is
a proper part of the world (but does not have to be a simple element with
no further proper parts), we can split the state of the world into two compo-
nents: one that is associated with the selected system, and the other charac-
terizing its environment (plus the requisite spatiotemporal relations between
the two). In other words, physical systems do not enter into any relations
with their environments that would not be already included in their intrinsic
properties plus spatiotemporal arrangements.
That Binary Separability implies Strong Supervenience can be proven as
follows. First, we can observe that Binary Separability implies Separability,
since Binary Separability can be applied to fundamental systems (points or
point-like objects), which proves that these systems and their intrinsic states
belong to the supervenience basis for the entire world. Next, assume that
Binary Separability is true and take any physical system S. Since the physical
state of S is part of the total state of the universe, by Separability it must
supervene on the Humean mosaic of fundamental objects and properties.
But if the state of S supervened on fundamental objects that are not parts
of S, this would violate Binary Separability, since the state of S would no
longer be an intrinsic property of S. Thus Strong Supervenience has to be
true as well. Hence, if we can argue that Humeans should accept Binary
Separability, they should also commit themselves to Strong Supervenience.
In order to help the reader keep track of the logical relations among
the array of metaphysical claims introduced and discussed in this paper, we
present the following diagram of mutual logical dependencies among these
claims, where arrows indicate the relation of logical entailment:
Binary Separability Strong Supervenience
Separability Supervenience
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Our assertion is that the committed Humean should accept Binary Separabil-
ity and thus all the remaining theses as well. However, even though Bohmian
mechanics is compatible with Separability and Supervenience, it violates Bi-
nary Separability and Strong Supervenience, which poses a challenge to the
Bohmians who want to subscribe to Humeanism.
Why isn’t simple Separability enough for a Humean? Why do we need a
stronger assumption regarding the supervenience of the whole on its parts?
One reason may be the intuition that the relation of supervenience should
“mesh” naturally with the intuitive mereological structure of the world.13
Suppose that Binary Separability is false while Separability remains true.
This means that the supervenience basis for the entire Humean mosaic for
the world consisting of the fundamental objects and their properties cannot
be divided up into the smaller supervenience bases for the objects composed
of the corresponding elements of the fundamental mosaic. Let us choose
a subset P of the set of all fundamental (point-like) objects that compose
a particular physical system S. Even though the entire mosaic of point-
like objects constitutes the supervenience basis for the world, the subset P
does not analogously ground the state of system S. The state of system S
supervenes not only on P but on some elements outside of P as well. Thus
the part-whole relation is not compatible with the supervenience relation.
Still, this argument may not convince all Humeans. For example, Bho-
gal and Perry (2017) defend the view that Separability is all the Humean
could ever want, and that introducing any stronger principle, such as Binary
Separability or Strong Supervenience, does not add anything of value to the
Humean. They believe that Separability already satisfies the requirements of
no modal irreducible facts and of no necessary connections, so why bother?
To that we can repeat what has already been said earlier that Separability
assures only the non-existence of necessary connections between fundamental
entities, but does not guarantee that such connections will not appear at a
higher level. Without Binary Separability a complex physical system may
display irreducible connections with its environment due to the fact that the
supervenience basis for its state extends beyond its spatiotemporal parts.14
In response to the above argument one may object that Humeans can
13Some might object that such a (standard) mereological structure is compatible with
a classical world. We are going to discuss this point in the next section.
14Miller (2016) acknowledges that the acceptance of such connections amounts to the
reinstatement of the anti-Humean doctrine of holism. She writes « [S]uppose it turns out
that we can distinguish singlet and triplet pairs on the basis of differing relations their
members bear to other elemental parts of the universe. We again might think this global
interdependence itself indicates some kind of holism [...] regardless of whether entangled
wholes bear any non-supervenient intrinsic properties» (p. 512).
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and do happily accept some cases in which seemingly local states of affairs
turn out to be dependent on the global distribution of properties.15 Take for
instance the Humean regularity analysis of causation. Considering a single
instance of causal interaction, for instance a stone smashing a window, the
Humean will insist that this individual causal fact actually supervenes on
the totality of similar cases in which a breakage of a fragile object follows
a collision with a fast-moving projectile.16 If the supervenience basis for a
singular causal fact contains states of affairs external with respect to this
fact, why can’t the same apply to the case of the state of a physical system?
To that we reply that there is a fundamental ontological difference be-
tween purported causal facts and physical states of systems. Causality is an
inherently modal notion, and as such is the subject of a reductionist analysis
by Humean standards. Providing such a reductionist analysis in terms of
global regularities does not show that a genuine local state of affairs super-
venes on some extrinsic facts. Rather, Humeans would insist that singular
causal facts are not local to begin with –they necessarily involve facts regard-
ing external objects and systems. To put it differently, the Humean analysis
of causation amounts to an elimination of causal connections between par-
ticular events, if we interpret such connections as modal facts intrinsic to
appropriate pairs of events. But physical states of systems are supposed to
be genuinely non-modal, so prima facie there is no reason why the Humean
should reduce them to more fundamental properties and their distributions.
A similar response can be provided with respect to other purported coun-
terexamples to the Humean prohibition of necessary connections between
distinct entities and their properties. There is an undeniable necessary link
between the value associated with a ten-dollar bill in my wallet and the
decision of the Federal Reserve to increase the budget deficit by printing
more money. Similarly, there a necessary connection linking the death of a
husband to the change of the marital status of his wife from being married
to being a widow. However, in both examples the properties involved (the
purchasing power of a currency, the marital status of a person) are, to put
it loosely, “conventional" or “human-dependent". And as such they are un-
likely to be part of the most fundamental description of the world (they fail
to “carve nature at its joints”, using David Lewis’ famous characterization
of natural properties vis-à-vis non-natural ones; see e.g. Lewis, 1999). In
a sense, there is no objective, physical fact of the matter as to whether a
person is married, divorced or widowed – all there is here is a certain social
15We owe this objection to Michael Esfeld (private communication).
16Another reductive analysis of that kind concerns individual chances of events which for
Humeans are analyzable in terms of frequencies of occurrences of similar events throughout
the history of the universe.
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norm that designates a person as such. And while Humeanism does not log-
ically imply physicalism, it seems that in the context of the discussions on
the metaphysics of fundamental scientific theories we should adopt physical-
ism as a working hypothesis. Thus we believe that whereas Humeans do not
have to reject all necessary connections, they are certainly obliged to explain
away such connections when they involve legitimate physical properties used
in our best scientific theories, regardless of whether they are attributed to
simple objects with no parts or complex entities.
As we have shown, Bohumians are forced to accept the existence of neces-
sary, nomological connections between the physical state of composite quan-
tum systems and the configuration of the environment. We insist that this
constitutes a violation of the general spirit of Humeanism, and we have tried
to deal with some arguments purporting to show that Humeans can happily
live with this form of necessary connections between distinct entities. At
this point, however, we think that the onus is on the Bohumian to provide
an explanation of why we are allowed to relax the strictures of traditional
Humeanism as conceived by its founder, who definitely didn’t have in mind
the fundamental Bohmian particles when he scorned the existence of objec-
tive necessary links connecting distinct entities. In other words, why is the
separability of the objects at the fundamental level enough for a modern
Humean?
One legitimate way to respond to this challenge could be to insist that
only fundamental entities exist in the literal sense of the word, while com-
posite objects are mere constructs used for the purpose of economy and can
be eliminated from the ontologically committing contexts.17 This position,
akin to mereological nihilism, rejects the existence of necessary connections
between complex entities simply by rejecting the existence of the entities in
question. We may note that Bhogal and Perry do not subscribe to this view,
since they explicitly include in the total state of the world what they call
the L-state, i.e. the collection of physical states attributed to spatiotemporal
regions that do not supervene on the states of their subregions (Bhogal and
Perry, 2017, p. 77). Hence they have to assume the existence of objects (re-
gions) that are neither point-like nor identical with the entire universe. This
move can be seen as conflicting with the ontologically reductionist spirit of
the Humean framework. However, at this point, it looks like the only way the
committed Humean could abandon Strong Supervenience without reneging
on the intuition of no necessary connections is by denying the literal existence
17We cannot offer any precise definition of the term “literal existence” (or “fundamental
existence”) other than that it is meant to refer to the irreducible ontological commitments
of our best theories when expressed in a most parsimonious and simplest language possible,
stripped of all metaphors and unnecessary vocabulary.
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of complex physical systems. This strategy will be the subject of the next
section.
5 A Possible Way Out
So it seems that now the Bohumian is cornered. Either she accepts that
Strong Supervenience is vacuously equivalent to Supervenience because there
are no physical systems other than individual points (or point-like objects)
and the universe, or she altogether abandons Strong Supervenience under-
stood as a principle that is genuinely stronger than Supervenience, thus let-
ting her framework be haunted by a ghost of necessity.
At this point, the Bohumian might be tempted to buy into the second
horn of the dilemma, and just accept as a bare fact of the matter that some
physical systems may display mutual irreducible connections that do not de-
pend on their spatial separations. After all, Hume’s tenets are a heritage from
a pre-quantum era, so there would be nothing unreasonable in seeking to rad-
ically revise the doctrine under the light of modern physics. The Bohumian
might further point out that the problem of necessary connections between
distant systems plagues also Best System Approaches to classical mechanics
(see in particular Huggett, 2006, section 5). In that case, the problem is
roughly that the way regularities in a small region A of the mosaic determine
inertial frames is so strong that it automatically fixes all the other inertial
frames throughout the universe, including a far distant region B. Indeed, the
construction makes automatically true the counterfactual “had the regulari-
ties been different in A, the inertial frames in B would have been different”.18
Going back to the quantum case, the Bohumian can furthermore point out
that the existence of such irreducible necessary connections do not affect
the way physics is done in the lab. It is in fact clear that for all practical
purposes the effective wave function is insensitive to the exact configuration
of the environment as long as no measurement-like interaction happens. So
Bohumians may be tempted to downplay the ontological significance of the
necessary connection between a given system and its environment. How-
ever, it is quite obvious why this FAPP approach fails. If we can convince
ourselves that the quantum state of a system is practically intrinsic to this
system, then Maudlin’s original argument against Separability returns in full
force!
In our opinion, the most promising way out of the impasse is to go for the
18Huggett is very careful to attach the notion of frame to that of a reference body (see
Huggett, 2006, page 46, second paragraph), so the talk of frames here is just a shorthand
for referring to elements of the mosaic.
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first horn of the dilemma and show that this choice does not necessarily entail
a commitment to any kind of anti-realism with respect to macroscopic objects
radical enough to fly in the face of scientific practice (or even common sense,
for that matter). Needless to say, this option requires a careful examination
and discussion of its weak points, which we cannot afford in the remaining
parts of this paper. We hope that our subsequent remarks, preliminary as
they may be, will prompt further investigations by philosophers interested in
these matters.
We first of all notice that quantum physicists themselves acknowledge
the fact that entanglement is an “infection” that spreads via decoherence
throughout the entire universe. This in particular means that even in stan-
dard physical practice the distinction between a quantum system and its
environment is just an approximation made for practical purposes and valid
on very small spacetime-scales. This is exactly what is conveyed in Bohmian
mechanics through the treatment of effective wave functions presented in sec-
tion 3. Furthermore, the undivided nature of the universe is strongly implied
by the universal non-local dynamics of the theory. These are the reasons
why Bohmian mechanics does not support any part/whole relation that goes
beyond the particle/configuration distinction.
So what is the place for electron pairs, or even tables, chairs, and the
like in all of this? The key consideration here is that such a categorization
of reality is made by us, but may be argued to be unnecessary for Bohmian
mechanics in order to be empirically adequate.19 All Bohmian mechanics
needs in order to fit into the physical practice is presented in section 3. But, if
that is the case, why do we in fact make such a categorization? Because of the
role that these objects play in the lab20 (or in our lives). Thus we call a thing
“chair” because it has such and such shape and it sustains our weight when we
sit on it. Note that it is extremely simple to argue that the previous sentence
is nothing but a shorthand description of how a bunch of particles trajectories
relate to another bunch of particles trajectories throughout spacetime. Of
course, it has to be stressed that what individuates a chair is its functional
role, not just its shape, otherwise we could have cases in which a bunch
of particles coalesce into ethereal chairs floating around. This is not to say
that complex subsystems are mere arbitrary constructs. It is still the particle
trajectories that determine which sub-configurations are salient and which are
not. However, as already said, this salience boils down to the way particle
19We do not wish to enter the debate on the exact meaning of empirical adequacy and
its relation to perception and scientific practice. A proper analysis of these topics would
require at least a separate article.
20Here the word “lab” is intended in the broadest sense possible, including, e.g., astro-
physical systems.
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trajectories are related. In this sense, there is no human arbitrariness involved
in the definition of a chair, but still a chair is defined by the functional role
it plays with respect to humans.21 That being said, it is also possible to
go further and argue that our perception of a chair sustaining our weight
can be given in terms of correlations between trajectories of “chair” particles
and those of our “brain” particles. For those still skeptical that Bohmian
mechanics supports such a functionalist-like reduction of subsystems we can
point out that the procedure to define an effective wave function literally
is a functional definition of a subsystem. Hence we submit that, by going
for a functionalist-like account of subsystems, we can defend a minimalist
Humean primitive ontology without claiming that such subsystems, including
macroscopic objects, are mere illusions or arbitrary constructs.22
From what we have said so far, still it is not clear why Strong Superve-
nience and Binary Separability seem so compelling principles to our intuitions
when, in fact, they cut no metaphysical ice. In other words, even granted
that everything can be ontologically reduced in a strong sense to an under-
lying universal dance of particles, still there is no convincing explanation for
the fact that it is totally natural to think (i) that all that can be predicated
of a chair is reducible to facts happening in the spacetime region where the
“chair” particles’ trajectories are located, and (ii) that a coarse-grained ver-
sion of the mosaic still represents a legitimate Humean supervenience basis.
The answer to these doubts lies in the quantum-to-classical transition. Actu-
ally, the classical limit of Bohmian mechanics is still largely work-in-progress
(see, e.g., Allori et al., 2002), so a full answer is still to come. Very roughly
speaking, because of the decoherence mechanism, effective Bohmian states
(ψ,q) evolve at large spatiotemporal scales as classical states (p,q), thus
washing away the non-local dependencies at a macroscopic level. This gives
the appearance of having a situation in which Strong Supervenience holds,
that is, where non-fundamental levels have the same ontological “dignity” as
the fundamental one. Of course, overlooking this fact, and thus considering
coarse-grained classical states in parallel with the fine-grained Bohmian dy-
namics would muddle the ontological waters enough to create the problems
introduced in the previous section.
To sum up, the suggested strategy for Bohumians is to question the funda-
mental ontological reality of complex physical systems other than the entire
universe. This move solves all the problems described earlier at one bold
stroke. The theses of Separability and Supervenience become trivially equiv-
21But not only humans, of course: a chair can sustain, say, a pile of books, not just a
person!
22This line of reasoning is adopted by Dickson (2000) as a reply to the challenge in
Bedard (1999).
18
alent, as now the universe is considered the only complex physical system in
existence. Even more importantly, Supervenience and Strong Supervenience
collapse into one, since the physical state of the universe is by definition in-
trinsic to its bearer. The success of this strategy, which may be called Austere
Bohumianism, depends primarily on the plausibility of the aforementioned
story that purports to explain the appearances of complex structures, in-
cluding but not limited to the macroscopic objects of our experience. Even
if we accept that austere Bohumians can offer a convincing explanation of
how such objects emerge from the underlying reality of swarming elemental
particles, still one ontological price to be paid is the rejection of the principles
of mereology. Humeanism is definitely not a free lunch.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have tried to assess the compatibility of the Humean tenets
with Bohmian mechanics. While we side with Miller, Esfeld, Bhogal, and
Perry in claiming, pace Maudlin, that quantum mechanics does not put the
reductionist core of the Humean doctrine in serious jeopardy, we nonetheless
submit that the literature on the subject has so far glossed over a serious
consequence that salvaging Humeanism in a Bohmian framework implies. In
fact, if we want to repel Maudlin’s challenge, we basically need to abandon
the intuitive –and scientifically successful– picture of the world as having a
standard, well behaved mereological structure ((in the sense of displaying
a part-whole structure that meshes with the relation of supervenience, as
explained in section 4). The point, then, is to decide how much of the
Humean doctrine actually rests upon the assumption of such a structure,
that is, how much of the strong supervenience principle is dispensable without
perverting the nature of Humean supervenience thesis. And even if Strong
Supervenience can be salvaged in its entirety, the question remains what
other concessions have to be made in order to preserve the main tenets of
Humeanism.
In order to forestall possible objections, we would like to stress that we
do not insist that there is one, well-defined view that can be properly called
“Humeanism”. On that issue we side with Earman and Roberts (2005) who
wrote: “[“Humean Supervenience”] is a name shared by many different the-
ses, differing from one another in subtle ways, though they are all intended
to capture the same general view of the world” (p. 2), and then added even
more forcefully “Thus, HS [i.e. Humean Supervenience] has acquired a status
like the one that doctrines like materialism, dualism, and empiricism often
appear to have: there seems to be an idea there, that one can be determi-
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nately for or against, even while it remains an open question exactly how the
idea should be formulated” (p. 3). As we have explained above, we believe
that one legitimate way to formulate the idea of Humean Supervenience is
in terms of the principles we call Strong Supervenience or Binary Separabil-
ity, even though we acknowledge that some philosophers who subscribe to
the broad doctrine of Humeanism may be unwilling to accept these princi-
ples. By showing that Bohumianism does not respect Strong Supervenience
or Binary Separability we do not commit a straw man fallacy against those
philosophers, but rather bring to the surface a potentially troubling con-
sequence of their position (the existence of necessary connections between
complex physical systems), which in our opinion has been ignored in recent
debates. If they are happy with a version of Humeanism that accepts this
consequence, we have nothing to say against that, other than that there are
other variants of Humeanism on the market.23
The doctrine we call Austere Bohumianism restores the Humean order
at the fundamental level of reality. It dispenses altogether with glaringly
anti-Humean phenomena such as holism and non-separability that, as we are
being told, permeate the quantum world. Yet this victory has its price, as we
have already conceded. The complex systems emerging from the underlying
dance of particles must be interpreted as ontologically secondary (in com-
parison to the full-fledged reality of Bohmian particles), lest they become a
threat to Humeanism either by exhibiting holistic, irreducible features, or by
displaying suspicious necessary connections with their environments.24 It is
rather interesting to observe that while the Bohumians gladly accept that for
all practical purposes the world behaves as if consisting of isolated and well-
individualized systems equipped with their own quantum states, they are not
so keen to admit that for all practical purposes the world at the micro-level
but not limited to fundamental particles looks decidedly anti-Humean, as ev-
idenced by the cases of singlet- and triplet-spin states of composite systems
of particles. This “illusion of anti-Humeanism” evaporates when we move to
the fundamental level of reality, but so does the familiar picture of chairs,
trees, and many-particle systems of textbook quantum mechanics. It seems
23Incidentally, it is worth pointing out that Earman and Roberts themselves argue for
a variant of Humeanism that seems to be very close to our interpretation based on Binary
Separability. They namely interpret the Humean base to which all the facts should be
reducible as consisting of non-nomic facts that can be outcomes of spatiotemporally finite
observation or measurement procedures (p. 17), and they add that their formulation does
not make reference to point-like entities (p. 20 ft. 29). So it seems that on their approach
states of composite physical systems can be included in the Humean base.
24It is interesting to note that this provides the proponents of mereological nihilism with
a new argument based on the foundations of physics, aside from the usual arguments from
metaphysics.
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that Humeans may be ultimately tempted to go all the way and insist, as
Democritus would put it, that nothing exists except atoms and empty space;
everything else is opinion.
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